Second SinoJapanese War

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The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) was a major invasion of eastern China by Japan preceding and during World War II. It ended with the surrender of Japan in 1945. In Chinese, the war is variously known as the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War of Resistance (中国人民抗日战争), Anti-Japanese War of Resistance (抗日战争), War of Resistance (抗战), or Eight Years' War of Resistance (八年抗战).

The war is also known in Japan as HEI, the "C" Operation, The Chinese Invasion, or the Japanese-Chinese War (日中戦争, Nitchū Sensō,), a Strategic Plan made by the Imperial Japanese Army as part of their large-scale plans to control the Asian mainland. The early manifestations of this plan were commonly known as "China Incidents". The 1931 invasion of Manchuria by Japan is referred to as the Mukden Incident. The last of these was called 'Lukouchiao' or the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

Invasion of China

Most historians place the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War on the Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) on July 7, 1937. Contemporary Chinese historians, however place the starting point at the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. Following the Mukden Incident, the Japanese Guandong Army occupied Manchuria and established the puppet state of Manchukuo in February 1932. Japan pressured China into recognising the independence of Manchukuo.

Following the Battle of Lugou Bridge in 1937, the Japanese occupied Shanghai, Nanjing and Southern Shanxi as part of campaigns involving approximately 200,000 Japanese soldiers, and considerably more Chinese soldiers. Chinese historians estimate as many as 300,000 people perished in the Nanjing Massacre, after the fall of Nanjing.

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident not only marked the beginning of an open, undeclared, war between China and Japan, but also hastened the formation of the second Kuomintang-Communist Party of China (CCP) United Front. The collaboration took place with salutary effects for the beleaguered CCP. The distrust between the two antagonists was scarcely veiled. Their alliance was forged literally at gun point when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped in the Xian incident and forced to ally with the CCP. The uneasy alliance began breaking down by late 1938, despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich Yangtze River Valley in central China. After 1940, conflict between the Nationalists and Communists became more frequent in the areas outside Japanese control. The Communists expanded their influence wherever opportunities were presented, through mass organizations, administrative reforms, land and tax reform measures favoring peasants -- and the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence.

The Japanese had neither the intention nor the capability of directly administering China. Their goal was to set up friendly puppet governments favorable to Japanese interests. However, the atrocities of the Japanese army made the governments that were set up very unpopular, and the Japanese refused to negotiate with either the Kuomintang or the Communist Party of China, which could have brought them popularity.

Chinese Strategy

File:Chinese soldiers 1939.jpg
Chinese soldiers march to the front in 1939

Compared to Japan, China was unprepared for war and had little military industrial strength, few mechanized divisions, and virtually no armor support. Up until the mid 1930s China had hoped that the League of Nations would provide countermeasures to Japan's aggression. In addition, the Kuomintang government was mired in an internal war against the Communists. Chiang famously quoted "the Japanese are a disease of skin, the Communists are a disease of the heart". Though the communists formed the New Fourth Army and the 8th Route Army which were nominally under the command of the National Revolutionary Army, the Unified Front was never truly unified, as each side was preparing for a showdown with the other once the Japanese were driven out. All these disadvantages forced China to adopt a strategy whose first goal was to preserve its army strength, whereas a full frontal assault on the enemy would often prove to be suicidal. Also, pockets of resistance were to be continued in occupied areas to pester the enemy and make their administration over the vast lands of China difficult. As a result the Japanese really only controlled the cities and railroads, while the countrysides were almost always hotbeds of partisan activity.

However, Chiang realized that in order to win the support from the United States or other foreign nations, China must prove that it was indeed capable of fighting. A fast retreat would discourage foreign aid so Chiang decided to make the Battle of Shanghai his grand stage. Chiang sent his elite German trained army to defend China's largest and most commercialized city from the Japanese. The battle saw heavy casualties on both sides and ended with a Chinese retreat. While the battle was a military defeat for the Chinese, it proved that China was not willing to be defeated and showcased the Chinese determination to the world. The battle lasted over three months and proved to be an enormous morale booster as it ended the Japanese taunt of conquering Shanghai in three days and China in three months.

While this direct army to army fighting lasted during the early phases of the war, large numbers of Chinese defeats compared to few victories eventually led to the strategy of stalling the war. Large areas of China were conquered during the early stages of the war but the Japanese advancements began to stall. The Chinese strategy at this point was to prolong the war until it had sufficient foreign aid to defeat the Japanese. Chinese troops engaged in a practice of scorched earth in an attempt to slow down the Japanese. Dams and levees were sabotaged which led to the 1938 Huang He flood. By 1940, the war had reached a stalemate with both sides making minimal gains. The Chinese had successfully defended their land from oncoming Japanese on several occasions while strong resistance in areas occupied by the Japanese made a victory seem impossible to the Japanese. This frustrated the Japanese and led them to employ a policy of "burn all, kill all, destroy all" (三光政策). It was during this time period that a bulk of Japanese atrocities were committed.

File:Liuchow 1945.jpg
The Chinese return to Liuchow in July 1945

In 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor which brought the United States into the war. China officially declared war on Japan on 8 December. It refused to declare war earlier because receiving military aid while officially at war would break the neutrality of the donor nation. At this point, the strategy changed from survival to minimizing warfare. Chiang realized that the Americans would do a bulk of the fighting and were better equipped to fight the Japanese so he decided to curtail the activities of his army and focus on the potential civil war after the war. By 1945, it was obvious that the Japanese would soon be defeated so small advances were made by the Chinese army.

The basis of Chinese strategy during the war, which can be divided into three periods:

  • First Period: 7 July 1937 (Battle of Lugou Bridge) - 25 October 1938 (Fall of Hankou).
    • In this period, one key concept is the trading of "space for time" (Chinese: 以空间换取时间). The Chinese army would put up token fights to delay Japanese advance to northeastern cities, to allow the home front, along with its professionals and key industries, to retreat further west into Chongqing to build up military strength.
  • Second Period: 25 October 1938 (Fall of Hankou) - July, 1944
    • During the second period, the Chinese army adopted the concept of "magnetic warfare" to attract advancing Japanese troops to definite points where they were subjected to ambush, flanking attacks, and encirclements in major engagements. The most prominent example of this tactic is the successful defense of Changsha (长沙) numerous times.
  • Third Period: July 1944 - 15 August 1945
    • This period employs general full frontal counter-offensive.

The three periods are each divided into finer phases.

Chinese and Japanese equipment

Main article: National Revolutionary Army

The National Revolutionary Army possessed 80 Army infantry divisions with approximately 8,000 men each, nine independent brigades, nine cavalry divisions, two artillery brigades, 16 artillery regiments and one or two armored divisions. The Chinese Navy displaced only 59,000 tonnes and the Chinese Air Force comprised only 600 aircraft.

Chinese weapons were mainly produced in the Hanyang and Guangdong Arsenals. However, for most of the German-trained divisions, the standard firearms were German-made 7.92 mm Gewehr 98 and Karabiner 98k. The standard light machine gun was a local copy of the Czech 7.92 mm Brno ZB26. There were also Belgian and French LMGs. Surprisingly, the NRA did not purchase any of the infamous Maschinengewehr 34s from Germany, but did produce their own copies of them. On average in these divisions, there was 1 machine gun set for each platoon. Heavy machine guns were mainly locally-made 1924 water-cooled Maxim guns, from German blueprints. On average every battalion would get one heavy machine gun (about half of what actual German divisions got during the war). The standard sidearm was the 7.63 mm Mauser M1932 semi-automatic pistol, also known as C96.

Some divisions were equipped with 37mm PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns, and/or mortars from Oerlikon, Madsen, and Solothurn. Each infantry division had 6 French Brandt 81mm mortars and 6 Solothurn 20mm autocannons. Some independent brigades and artillery regiments were equipped with Bofors 72mm L/14, or Krupp 72mm L/29 mountain guns. They were 24 Rheinmetall 150mm L/32 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1934) and 24 Rheinmetall 150mm L/30 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1936).

Infantry uniforms were basically redesigned Zhongshan suits. Leg wrappings are standard for soldiers and officers alike since the primary mode of movement for NRA troops was by foot. The helmets were the most distinguishing characteristic of these divisions. From the moment German M35 helmets (standard issue for the Wehrmacht until late in the European theatre) rolled off the production lines in 1935, and until 1936, the NRA imported 315,000 of these helmets, each with the 12-star emblem of the ROC on the sides. Other equipment included cloth shoes for soldiers, leather shoes for officers and leather boots for high-ranking officers. Every soldier is issued ammunition, ammunition pouch/harness, a water flask, combat knives, food bag, and a gas mask.

Main article: Imperial Japanese Army

Although Japan possessed significant mobile operational capacity it did not possess capability for maintaining a long sustained war. At the commencement of the Chinese-Japanese War the Japanese Army comprised 17 divisions, each composed of approximately 22,000 men, 5,800 horses, 9,500 rifles and sub machine guns, 600 heavy machine guns of assorted types, 108 artillery pieces, and 24 tanks. Special forces were also available. The Japanese Navy displaced a total of 1,900,000 tonnes, ranking third in the world, and possessed 2,700 aircraft at the time. Each Japanese division was the equivalent in fighting strength of three Chinese regular divisions.

See Also:

Stalemate and foreign aid

By 1940, the fighting had reached a stalemate. While Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China, guerrilla fighting continued in the conquered areas. The Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek struggled on from a provisional capital at the city of Chongqing; however, realizing that he also faced a threat from communist forces of Mao Zedong, he mostly tried to preserve the remaining strength of his army and avoid heavy battle with the Japanese in the hopes of defeating the Communists once the Japanese left. China, with its low industrial capacities and limited experience in modern warfare, could not launch any decisive counter-offensive against Japan. Chiang could not risk an all-out campaign given the poorly-trained, under-equipped, and unorganized state of his armies and opposition to his leadership both within Kuomintang and in China at large. He had lost a substantial portion of his best trained and equiped army defending Shanghai and the remaining troops were used to preserve his army. On the other hand, Japan has suffered tremendous casualties from unexpectedly stubborn resistance from China and already developed problems in administering and garrisioning fallen territories. Neither side can make any swift progress in a manner resembling the fall of France and Western Europe to Nazi Germany.

Most military analysts predicted that the Kuomintang could not continue fighting with most of the war factories located in the prosperous areas under or near Japanese control. Other global powers were reluctant to provide any support — unless supporting an ulterior motive — because in their opinion the Chinese would eventually lose the war, and did not wish to antagonize the Japanese who might, in turn, eye their colonial posessions in the region. They expected any support given to Kuomintang might worsen their own relationship with the Japanese, who taunted the Kuomintang with the prospect of conquest within 3 months.

Germany and the Soviet Union did provide support to the Chinese before the war escalated to the Asian theatre of World War II. The Soviet Union was exploiting the Kuomintang government to hinder the Japanese from invading Siberia, thus saving itself from a two-front war. Furthermore, the Soviets expected any major conflict between the Japanese and the Chinese to hamper any Kuomintang effort to remove the Communist Party of China (CCP) opposition or, in the best case, hoped to install a Comintern ally surreptitiously after the dwindling of Kuomintang authority. Soviet technicians upgraded and handled some of the Chinese war-supply transport. Military supplies and advisors arrived, including future Soviet war hero Georgy Zhukov, who witnessed the Battle of Halhin Gol. It also supported the Communists, at least until war with Germany forced her into conserving everything for her own forces.

Because of Chiang Kai-shek's anti-communist nationalist policies and hopes of defeating the CCP, Germany provided the largest proportion of Kuomintang arms imports. German military advisors modernized and trained the Kuomintang armies; Kuomintang officers (including Chiang's second son) were educated in and served in the German army prior to World War II. Approximately more than half of the German arms exports during its rearmament period were to China. Nevertheless the proposed 30 new divisions equipped with all German arms did not materialize as the Germans sided with the Japanese later in World War II.

Other prominent powers, including the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France, only officially assisted in war supply contracts up to the attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941, when a major influx of trained military personnel and supplies significantly boosted the Kuomintang chance of maintaining the fight.

Unofficially, public opinion in the United States was becoming favorable to the Kuomintang. At the start of the 1930's, public opinion in the United States had tended to support the Japanese. However, reports of Japanese brutality added to Japanese actions such as the attack on the U.S.S. Panay swung public opinion sharply against Japan. By the start of 1941, the United States had begun to sponsor the American Volunteer Group otherwise known as the Flying Tigers to boost Chinese air defenses. In addition, the United States began an oil and steel embargo which made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China without another source of oil from Southeast Asia. This set the stage for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

The Pacific War

Within a few days of the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the United States and China officially declared war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek then received great quantities of supplies from the United States, as the Chinese conflict was merged into the Asian theatre of World War II. Chiang was appointed Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China theater in 1942. General Joseph Stilwell served for a time as Chiang's chief of staff, while commanding US forces in the China Burma India Theater.

However, relations between Stilwell and Chiang soon broke down, due largely to the corruption and inefficiency of the Chinese government. Despite massive amounts of American lend-lease aid (over US$5 billion from 1941 through 1945), the Nationalist Chinese Army frequently avoided major engagements with the Japanese and was seen as preferring to stockpile material for a later struggle with the communists. Stilwell criticised the Chinese government's conduct of the war in the American media, and to President Franklin Roosevelt. Chiang was hesitant to deploy more Chinese troops because China already suffered tens of milions of war casualties, and believed that Japan would eventually capitulate to America's overwhelming industrial output and manpower. The Allies thus lost confidence in the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from the Asian mainland , and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean Areas and South West Pacific Area, employing island hopping strategy.

Chiang and his associates also distrusted the intentions of United Kingdom and Stilwell. Winston Churchill's "Europe First" policy obviously did not sit well with Chiang. Furthermore, the British insistence that China devote more and more troops into Indochina in the Burma Campaign, was regarded as an attempt by Great Britain to use Chinese manpower to secure Britain's foothold in India from Japan. Chiang voiced his support of Indian Independence in a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi in 1942 further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom.

The United States saw the Chinese theater as a means to tie up a large number of Japanese troops, as well as being a possible location for American airbases. In 1944, as the Japanese position in the Pacific was deteriorating fast, they launched Operation Ichigo to attack the airbases which had begun to operate. This brought the Hubei, Henan, and Guangxi provinces under Japanese administration.

Nevertheless the Japanese prospect of transferring their troops to fight the Americans was in vain and they only committed the Guandong Army from Manchuria in their "Sho plan", which later facilitated the Soviet advancement after the Soviet war declaration on August 8 1945.

Number of troops involved

National Revolutionary Army

Main article: National Revolutionary Army

The NRA had approximately 4,300,000 regulars, in 370 Standard Divisions (正式师), 46 New Divisions (新编师), 12 Cavalry Divisions (骑兵师), 8 New Cavalry Divisions (新编骑兵师), 66 Temporary Divisions (暂编师), and 13 Reserve Divisions (预备师), for a grand total of 515 divisions. However, many divisions were formed from 2 or more other divisions, and not were active at the same time. Therefore the number of divisions in active service at any given time is much smaller than this. The average NRA division had 8,000-9,000 troops.

Main article: Chinese Red Army

Although during the war the Chinese Communist forces fought as a nominal part of the NRA, the number of those on the CCP side, due to their guerilla status, is difficult to say, though estimates place the total number of the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and irregulars in the Communist armies at 1,300,000.

For more information of combat effectiveness of communist armies and other units of Chinese forces see Chinese armies in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Japanese side

  • The IJA had 2,000,000 regulars. More Japanese troops were quagmired in China than deployed anywhere else, such as the Pacific Theater, during the war.
  • The Collaborationist Chinese Army (zh:僞軍) formed approximate 2,100,000, the only collaborationist army in WW2 which outnumbered the invading army. Almost all of them belonged to the regional puppet governments such as Manchukuo and collaborationist political leaders such as Wang Jingwei. The collaborationists were mainly assigned to garrison and logistics duties in areas held by the puppet governments and in occupied territories. They were rarely fielded in combat because of low morale and distrust by the Japanese, and fared poorly in skirmishes against real Chinese forces, whether the KMT or the CCP .

Casualties assessment

File:Nanjing1937 BabyOnTracks.jpeg
Shanghai 1937: One of the earlier images of the war to come out from China, this photo appeared in LIFE magazine

The conflict lasted for 97 months and 3 days (measured from 1937 to 1945).

Chinese Casualties

  • The Kuomintang fought in 22 major engagements, most of which involved more than 100,000 troops on both sides, 1171 minor engagements most of which involved more than 50,000 troops on both sides, and 38931 skirmishes.
  • The CCP mostly fought guerilla attacks in rural area in North China. It would later give them credence to win them support in the Chinese Civil War.
  • The Chinese lost approximately 3.22 million soldiers. 9.13 million civilians died in crossfire, and another 8.4 million as non-military casualties.
  • Property loss of the Chinese valued up to 383,301.3 million US dollars according to the currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times of the GDP of Japan at that time (770 million US dollars).
  • In addition, the war created ninety-five million refugees.

Japanese Casualties

The Japanese recorded around 1.1 million military casualties, killed, wounded and missing.


As of mid 1945, all sides expected the war to continue for at least another year. However it was suddenly ended by the dropping of the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan capitulated to the allies on August 14, 1945. The Japanese troops in China formally surrendered on September 9, 1945 and by the provisions of the Cairo Conference of 1943 the lands of Manchuria, Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands reverted to China. However, the Ryukyu islands were maintained as Japanese territory.

In 1945 China emerged from the war nominally a great military power but actually a nation economically prostrate and on the verge of all-out civil war. The economy deteriorated, sapped by the military demands of foreign war and internal strife, by spiraling inflation, and by Nationalist profiteering, speculation, and hoarding. Starvation came in the wake of the war, and millions were rendered homeless by floods and the unsettled conditions in many parts of the country. The situation was further complicated by an Allied agreement at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that brought Soviet troops into Manchuria to hasten the termination of war against Japan (Operation August Storm). Although the Chinese had not been present at Yalta, they had been consulted; they had agreed to have the Soviets enter the war in the belief that the Soviet Union would deal only with the Nationalist government. After the war, the Soviet Union, as part of the Yalta agreement's allowing a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria, dismantled and removed more than half the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese. The Soviet presence in northeast China enabled the Communists to move in long enough to arm themselves with the equipment surrendered by the withdrawing Japanese army. The problems of rehabilitating the formerly Japanese-occupied areas and of reconstructing the nation from the ravages of a protracted war were staggering, to say the least.

The war left the Nationalists severely weakened and their policies left them unpopular. Meanwhile the war strengthened the Communists, both in popularity and as a viable fighting force. At Yan'an and elsewhere in the "liberated areas," Mao was able to adapt Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by living and working with them, eating their food, and thinking their thoughts. When this failed, however, more repressive forms of coercion, indoctrination and ostracization were also employed. The Red Army fostered an image of conducting guerrilla warfare in defense of the people. In addition, the CCP was effectively split into "Red" (cadres working in the "liberated" areas) and "White" (cadres working underground in enemy-occupied territory) spheres, a split that would later sow future factionalism within the CCP. Communist troops adapted to changing wartime conditions and became a seasoned fighting force. Mao also began preparing for the establishment of a new China, well away from the front at his base in Yan'an. In 1940 he outlined the program of the Chinese Communists for an eventual seizure of power and began his final push for consolidation of CCP power under his authority. His teachings became the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that came to be formalized as Mao Zedong Thought. With skillful organizational and propaganda work, the Communists increased party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945. Soon, all out war broke out between the KMT and CPC, a war that would leave the Nationalists banished to Taiwan and the Communists victorious on the mainland.


Anti-Japanese War Memorial Museum on the site where Marco Polo Bridge Incident was set

To this day the war is a major point of contention between (both People's Republic and Republic of) China and Japan.

A small but vocal group of Japanese nationalists and/or right-wingers deny a variety of crimes attributed to Japan. The Japanese invasion of its neighbours is often glorified or whitewashed, and wartime atrocities, most notably the Nanjing Massacre, comfort women, and Unit 731, are frequently denied by such individuals. The Japanese government has also been accused of historical revisionism by allowing the approval of school textbooks omitting or glossing over Japan's militant past.

In the PRC, citizens are frequently reminded of the exploits of the heroes of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance. In its response to global criticism of Japanese textbook revisionism, the PRC government has been accused of using this incident to stir up already growing anti-Japanese feelings to whip up nationalistic sentiments and divert its citizens' minds from internal matters.

But political issue or not, the war remains a major roadblock for Sino-Japanese relations today, and many people, particularly in China, harbour grudges over the war and related issues.

Who really fought the Sino-Japanese War?

The question as to which political group directed the Chinese war effort and exerted most of the effort to resist the Japanese still remains a controversial issue.

In the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War of Resistance Memorial near the Marco Polo Bridge, the People’s Republic of China emphasizes that it was the Communist Party that directed Chinese efforts in the war and did everything to resist the Japanese invasion. (Recently, however, with a change in the political climate, the CCP has admitted that certain Nationalist generals made important contributions in resisting the Japanese). This emphasis on the CCP's central role is partially reflected by the PRC’s labeling of the war as the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War of Resistance rather than merely the War of Resistance. According to the PRC official point of view, the Nationalists/Kuomintang mostly avoided fighting the Japanese in order to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Communists.

Leaving aside Nationalists sources, scholars researching third party Japanese and Soviet sources have documented quite a different view. Such studies claim that the Communists actually played a miniscule involvement in the war against the Japanese compared to the Nationalists and used guerilla warfare as well as opium sales to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Kuomintang[1]. The Communists were not the main participants in the 22 major battles between China and Japan. Soviet liaison to the Chinese Communists Peter Vladimirov documented that he never once found the Chinese Communists and Japanese engaged in battle during the period from 1942 to 1945. He also expressed frustration at not being allowed by the Chinese Communists to visit the frontline[2], although as a foreign diplomat Vladimirov may have been optimistic to expect to be allowed to join Chinese guerrilla sorties. The Communists usually avoided open warfare (the Hundred Regiments Campaign and the Battle of Pingxingguan are notable exceptions), preferring to fight in small squads to harass the Japanese supply lines. In comparison, the Nationalists sent their best troops to defend Shanghai from the Japanese, a third of whom were killed. The Japanese considered the Kuomintang rather than the Communists as their main enemy[3] and bombed the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing to the point that it became the most heavily bombed city in the world to date[4].

A third perspective advocated by some historians is that the warlords actually did most of the fighting with the Japanese, considering that the majority of Chiang Kai Shek's army was actually led by warlords. While the Communists and Nationalists tried to preserve their troop strengths for a final showdown with each other and therefore failed to resist the Japanese to the fullest, the warlords had no choice but to commit everything to the defence of the territories that they jealously controlled. This perspective is not as well-known because both the Nationalists and Communists were against the warlords and the warlords were unlikely to have well-documented, extensive archives that the Nationalists and Communists have.

Major figures

China: Nationalist

China: Communist



Military engagements



Battles in Burmese Campaign

Attacks on civilians


  1. ^  Chang and Ming, July 12, 2005, pg. 8; and Chang and Halliday, pg. 233, 246, 286-287
  2. ^  Chang and Ming, July 12, 2005
  3. ^  Chang and Halliday, pg. 231
  4. ^  Chang and Halliday, pg. 232


See also

External links


de:Zweiter Japanisch-Chinesischer Krieg es:Segunda Guerra Sino-japonesa fr:Guerre sino-japonaise (1937-1945) ko:중일 전쟁 lt:Kinų - japonų karai nl:Tweede Chinees-Japanse oorlog ja:日中戦争 zh:抗日战争 (中国)