Reason

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For alternate senses see reason (disambiguation).

Reason is a term used in philosophy to refer to the higher cognitive faculties of the human mind. It describes a type of thought or aspect of thought, especially abstract thought, and the ability to think abstractly, which is felt to be especially human. The concept of reason is connected to language, as reflected in the meanings of the Greek word "logos", later to be translated by Latin "ratio" and then French "raison", from which the English word. The 1913 edition of Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary defines Reason as:

The faculty or capacity of the human mind by which it is distinguished from the intelligence of the inferior animals; the higher as distinguished from the lower cognitive faculties, sense, imagination, and memory, and in contrast to the feelings and desires. Reason comprises conception, judgment, reasoning, and the intuitional faculty. Specifically, it is the intuitional faculty, or the faculty of first truths, as distinguished from the understanding, which is called the discursive or ratiocinative faculty.

However, there is much disagreement between philosophical schools about the nature and function of reason, as well as about the extent to which it is unique to human beings, and the above definition is not universally accepted.

1 Reason and logic
- 1.1 Reason versus logic
- 1.2 Reason as logic
2 Reason and faith
3 References
4 External links

Reason and logic

The debate about the relationship of reason to logic extends back to the time of Plato and Aristotle. Plato made a distinction between reason and logic, whereas for Aristotle, the terms were essentially synonymous. The debate between these two viewpoints has continued down through the ages. Heinrich Heine, in On the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany, wrote: "Plato and Aristotle! These are not merely two systems, but rather two types of human nature, that stand, since time immemorial, in hostile opposition. Across the entire middle ages, to the greatest degree, and up to the present day, this battle was waged, and this battle is the essential content of Christian church history. Plato and Aristotle are always the issue, though other names may be used."

The Webster's definition cited above may be said to reflect the Platonic outlook, in that it refers to reason as "the faculty of first truths, as distinguished from the understanding, which is called the discursive or ratiocinative faculty."

In the Aristotelean or neo-Aristotelean camp, reason is narrowly defined as the faculty or process of drawing logical inferences. Such types of reasoning have traditionally been classified as either deductive reasoning, meaning "from the general to the particular", or inductive reasoning, meaning "from the particular to the general". In the 19th century, Charles Peirce, an American philosopher, named a third classification related to the second, abductive reasoning, by which he meant to include guessing or hypothesising. (In modern usage, "inductive reasoning" sometimes includes almost all non-deductive reasoning, including what Peirce would call "abductive". See also logic, term logic.)

The question of reason as the "faculty of first truths" is related to the topic of metaphysics, and in modern history there has been an ongoing debate between the proponents of metaphysics, and the empiricists such as David Hume, who deny the existence of a "faculty of first truths," and argue that all we know of the universe is gleaned from the application of logic to sensory data (the Platonists, in turn, argue that sensory information provides only imprecise reflections or "shadows" of reality, as in Plato's allegory of the cave, or reality as seen "through a glass darkly.") Bertrand Russell embarked on an ambitious project to produce a system of science that was completely devoid of metaphysics.

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Reason versus logic

Plato made a distinction between logic, i.e. reasoning that proceeds via Syllogism from a premise (which Plato calls understanding,) and reason, in this passage, part of what is sometimes referred to as the divided line:

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Edgar Allan Poe makes a similar point in his story, Mellonta Tauta. Here, "creeping" and "crawling" refer to induction and deduction:

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Reason as logic

Since the aforementioned Webster's definition was published in 1913, the prevailing views of reason have changed. A contemporary definition from the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary goes as follows:

(1) : the power of comprehending, inferring, or thinking especially in orderly rational ways : INTELLIGENCE (2) : proper exercise of the mind (3) : SANITY b : the sum of the intellectual powers

The definition of reason as the faculty of drawing logical inferences has gained considerable ground, to the point of being almost hegemonic, following the early 20th Century "revolt against idealism" and "revolt against metaphysics" (see Bertrand Russell: Analytic philosophy). The concept of reason as a type of thought that is "especially human" has been somewhat blurred, since animals (and computers -- see artificial intelligence) are capable of some forms of logical operations.

While deductive reasoning can logically result in a definite conclusion, it requires as a starting point for human investigation, that there are generalizations which can not be questioned.

But in the sense that animals, and humans, can unconsciously, associate different perceptions as causes and effects and then make decisions or even plans, (if these words may be used for the sake of this discussion), it is felt by many people that reason is more than just the ability to draw inferences. So reason has also been conceived more broadly. In Charles Peirce's terms, humans have "thirdness" while abductive reasoning is only "firstness".

The neurologist Terrence Deacon, following the tradition of Peirce, has recently distinguished the type of thinking which is most essential to human rational thinking as a type of associative thinking. Reason by his account therefore requires associating perceptions in a way which may be arbitrary (or nominal, conventional or "formal") - not just associating the image or "icon" of smoke and the image of fire, but, for example, the image of smoke and the English word "smoke", or indeed any made-up "index" or "symbol" (not necessarily a spoken word). What is essential is however not the arbitrariness of symbols, but how they used.

This fits into an older tradition which makes reason connected to language, but more specifically the ability to create language deliberately. Deacon and Peirce continue the English philosophical tradition: Thomas Hobbes describes the creation of “Markes, or Notes of remembrance” (Leviathan Ch.4) as “speech” (allowing by his definition that it is not necessarily a means of communication or speech in the normal sense; he was presumably thinking of "speech" as an English version of "logos" in this description). In the context of a language, these marks or notes are called "Signes" by Hobbes. David Hume, following John Locke (and Berkeley), who followed Hobbes, emphasized the importance of associations in thinking.

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson explicate reason and its scope in this manner:

Reason includes not only our capacity for logical inference, but also our ability to conduct inquiry, to solve problems, to evaluate, to criticize, to deliberate about how we should act, and to reach an understanding of ourselves, other people, and the world. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, pp. 3-4)

Proponents of the logical definition of reason differ as to their preference for either induction or deduction. While the English tradition is strongly empiricist, an influential example of the opposite is Immanuel Kant. For him, reason (Vernunft in Kant's German language) is the power of synthesizing into unity, by means of comprehensive principles, the concepts provided by the intellect (Verstand). The reason which gives a priori principles Kant calls "Pure Reason" (as in his A Critique of Pure Reason), as distinguished from the "Practical Reason" which is specially concerned with the performance of particular actions.

Modern proponents of a priori reasoning, at least with regards to language, are Noam Chomsky and Stephen Pinker, to whom Merlin Donald and Terrence Deacon can be very usefully contrasted.

Reason and faith

In theology, reason, as distinguished from faith, is the human critical faculty exercised upon religious truth whether by way of discovery or by way of explanation. Some commentators have claimed that Western civilization can be almost defined by its serious testing of the limits of tension between reason and faith - Jerusalem and Athens. Leo Strauss spoke of a "Greater West" which included all areas under the influence of the tension between Greek and Abrahamic thinking, including the Moslem lands. He was particularly influenced by the great moslem philosopher Al-Farabi. In order to consider to what extent Eastern philosophy might have partaken of these important tensions, it is perhaps best to consider whether dharma or tao may be equivalent to Nature (by which we mean physis (Greek).

The limits within which reason may be used have been laid down differently in different churches and periods of thought: on the whole, modern religion tends to allow to reason a wide field, reserving, however, as the sphere of faith the ultimate (supernatural) truths of theology.

For a critique of reason's preeminent position within western culture since the Renaissance, see Voltaire's Bastards by John Ralston Saul.